Micro to Macro: Optimal Trade Policy with Firm Heterogeneity by Costinot, Arnaud et al.
Micro to Macro:









The empirical observation that “large firms tend to export, whereas small firms
do not” has transformed the way economists think about the determinants of interna-
tional trade. Yet, it has had surprisingly little impact on how economists think about
trade policy. Under very general conditions, we show that from the point of view of a
country that unilaterally imposes trade taxes to maximize domestic welfare, the self-
selection of heterogeneous firms into exports calls for import subsidies on the least
profitable foreign firms. In contrast, our analysis does not provide any rationale for
export subsidies or taxes on the least profitable domestic firms.
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1 Introduction
There are large firms and small firms. The former tend to export whereas the latter do
not. What are the policy implications of that empirical observation?
Models of firm heterogeneity have transformed the way economists think about the
determinants of international trade. Yet, the same models have had relatively limited
impact on how they think about trade policy. The goal of this paper is to fill this gap on
the normative side of the literature and uncover the general principles that should guide
the design of optimal trade policy when heterogeneous firms select into exporting.
Our baseline environment is a canonical model of intra-industry trade with monopo-
listic competition and firm-level heterogeneity. The main building blocks are taken from
Melitz (2003). We assume that labor is the only factor production, that all cost functions
are linear, and that preferences have Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES). Compared
to Melitz (2003), we allow firms to be heterogeneous in terms of both their variable costs
and their fixed costs and impose no restrictions on the joint distribution of these costs
across firms and markets. In this sense, the pattern of selection into exports, which is the
main focus of our analysis, is unrestricted.
Our baseline results offer a full characterization of the ad-valorem taxes that maxi-
mize domestic welfare, which we label unilaterally optimal taxes, when a country’s gov-
ernment is free to impose different taxes on different firms and the rest of the world is
passive. Our main finding is that the self-selection of heterogeneous firms into exports
calls for import subsidies on the least profitable foreign firms. The standard case for an
optimal import tariff is based on the idea that neither consumers nor firms internalize the
impact of their import decisions on import prices. In a neoclassical environment where
import prices increase with quantities, a government should thus impose a positive tax on
imports proportional to this negative terms-of-trade effect. Selection does not affect this
broad logic, but flips the sign of the relationship between prices and quantities. When
firms only export if they can sell enough, an increase in imported quantities lowers the
prices of goods sold by firms that would have not selected into exports otherwise. For
marginal firms, prices de facto jump from their reservation values to a lower finite price.
This creates a motive for import subsidies on the least profitable foreign firms.
In contrast, our baseline analysis does not provide any rationale for export subsidies
or taxes on the least profitable domestic firms. At the macro level, a government may
want to manipulate the total amount of exports because of general equilibrium consider-
ations. But conditional on the aggregate level of exports, the allocation of resources across
firms in the environments that we consider is efficient. Unlike domestic consumers that
1
ignore that buying more from foreign firms may lower the domestic prices that they face,
domestic firms fully internalize the benefit of exporting or not, up to general equilibrium
considerations. This leads to optimal export taxes or subsidies that are uniform across all
domestic firms.
The last part of our paper establishes the robustness of our conclusions to various
generalizations. In terms of the economic environment, we introduce multiple factors of
production and variable marginal costs; we allow goods to belong to different groups,
without imposing any restriction on how consumers derive utility from those groups;
we introduce arbitrarily many countries; and we allow free entry, without imposing any
restriction on how firms may also vary in terms of their entry costs. With general tech-
nology and preferences, we show that our results continue to apply industry-by-industry,
where an industry is either defined with respect to supply considerations, as a subset of
firms with the same factor intensity, or with respect to demand considerations, as one of
the aforementioned groups of goods. With multiple countries, they apply country-by-
country. With free entry, they hold without further qualifications.
In terms of policy instruments, we explore two alternatives to our benchmark envi-
ronment. The first one is richer and allows firm-specific two-part tariffs; the second one
is more restricted and no longer allows taxes to vary across firms from a given origin.
In the former case, we still find import subsidies on the less profitable foreign firms and
uniform export taxes or subsidies on the domestic firms. Compared to our baseline anal-
ysis, the only difference is that import subsidies now take the form of lower fixed fees,
which are non-distortionary, rather than lower linear taxes, which are. In the latter case,
we demonstrate that uniform import tariffs are necessarily lower when selection is active
than when it is not.
We conclude by extending our results to the case of a trade war where both coun-
tries are strategic and set taxes in a simultaneous move game. At a Nash equilibrium,
we show that our conclusions are unchanged: (i) domestic taxes are uniform across all
domestic producers; (ii) export taxes are uniform across all exporters; and (iii) import
taxes are uniform across Foreign’s most profitable exporters and strictly increasing with
profitability across its least profitable ones.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 offers a brief review of the
related literature. Section 3 describes our basic environment. Section 4 sets up and solves
the micro and macro planning problems of a welfare-maximizing country manipulating
its terms-of-trade. Section 5 shows how to decentralize the solution to the planning prob-
lems through micro and macro trade taxes when governments are free to discriminate
across firms. Section 6 generalizes our results. Section 7 offers some concluding remarks.
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2 Related Literature
Few economic mechanisms have received as much empirical support as the selection of
heterogeneous firms into exporting; see e.g. Bernard and Jensen (1999), Bernard, Eaton,
Jensen and Kortum (2003), Bernard, Jensen, Redding and Schott (2007), and Eaton, Ko-
rtum and Kramarz (2011). Policy makers have paid attention. As documented in the
World Trade Report 2016, there were only two regional trade agreements (RTA) with pro-
visions related to small- and medium-sized enterprises (SME) prior to 1990. As of March
2016, 133 RTAs, representing 49% of all the notified RTAs, included at least one provision
mentioning SMEs explicitly.
Ironically, there has been little academic research to date about the policy implica-
tions of the endogenous selection of heterogeneous firms into exporting.1 Demidova and
Rodríguez-Clare (2009) is an early exception. They study the optimal uniform tax in a
small open economy version of the Melitz model with Pareto distributions of firm-level
productivity, CES preferences and uniform fixed exporting costs. This is a special case of
the environment that we consider in Section 6.2. Since Demidova and Rodríguez-Clare
(2009) assume that taxes are uniform across firms, their analysis is necessarily silent about
whether governments should, from a unilateral standpoint, tax large firms or small firms
differently and, in turn, whether trade agreements should ever include provisions related
to small firms.
The same restriction to uniform taxes applies to more recent papers analyzing opti-
mal trade policy in environments with heterogeneous firms, including Felbermayr, Jung
and Larch (2013), who extend the results of Demidova and Rodríguez-Clare (2009) to
economies with two large countries, Ossa (2011), who studies the gains from GATT/WTO
negotiations, Haaland and Venables (2016), Bagwell and Lee (2018b), and Campolmi,
Fadinger and Forlati (2018), who analyze economies with multiple sectors, and Demi-
dova (2017) and Bagwell and Lee (2018a), who study economies with linear demand.2
Our analysis, in contrast, focuses on the optimal structure of firm-level trade taxes. Under
very general conditions, we show that selection creates a rationale for unilateral beggar-
thy-neighbor import subsidies on the least profitable foreign firms. Since this pattern is
also a feature of any Nash equilibrium, our findings suggests that rather than expanding
the exports of SMEs, an optimal trade agreement may want to restrict them.
1The last handbook of international economics, Gopinath, Helpman and Rogoff, eds (2014), is a case in
point. Maggi’s (2014) chapter on trade policy does not feature any paper about firm heterogeneity. Melitz
and Redding’s (2014) chapter on heterogeneous firms only features one paper about trade policy.
2Ossa (2011) introduces firm heterogeneity in his online appendix available at
https://www.econ.uzh.ch/en/people/faculty/ossa/research.html.
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Our paper is related to a large body of work exploring the optimality of allocations
under monopolistic competition, from the original work of Spence (1976) and Dixit and
Stiglitz (1977) to the more recent work of Nocco, Ottaviano and Salto (2014), Dhingra
and Morrow (2019) and Nocco, Ottaviano and Salto (2019). Away from the case of CES
preferences, it is well-known that there are domestic distortions and that the laissez-faire
equilibrium is inefficient. We impose CES preferences to abstract from these considera-
tions. Hence, the allocation in the laissez-faire equilibrium is globally efficient, but coun-
tries may individually impose trade taxes to improve their own welfare. We then fully
characterize the structure of this policy.3
Our analysis shares with Romer (1994) an emphasis on the welfare implications of new
foreign goods. He studies a small open economy where foreign firms face fixed costs of
exporting differentiated inputs. Starting from free trade, he demonstrates that imposing
a tariff creates first-order welfare losses equal to the “Dupuit triangles” associated with
the foreign goods no longer imported. He does not, however, analyze optimal trade pol-
icy. Our result that optimal import tariffs are decreasing with firms’ profitability instead
reflects a trade-off between the potential losses from Dupuit triangles and the potential
losses from Harberger triangles generated by lower import tariffs.
In terms of methodology, we build on the work of Costinot, Lorenzoni and Werning
(2014) and Costinot, Donaldson, Vogel and Werning (2015) who characterize the structure
of optimal trade taxes in a dynamic endowment economy and a static Ricardian economy,
respectively. Like these papers, we use a primal approach and general Lagrange multi-
plier methods to characterize optimal wedges rather than explicit policy instruments. The
novel aspect of our analysis is to break down the problem of finding optimal wedges into
a series of micro subproblems, where we study how to choose quantities across varieties
conditional on aggregate quantities, and a macro problem, where we solve for the optimal
aggregate quantities. The solutions to the micro problems determines the structure of op-
timal micro taxes described above, whereas the solutions to the macro problem delivers
the overall level of those taxes.
Our approach has two attractive features. First, it is well suited to deal with zeros, a
central aspect of any selection model. Despite the fact that the government’s optimization
problem is infinite dimensional and that firm’s technologies are non-convex, our micro
3Our paper is also related, though less closely, to political-economy models of trade policy with het-
erogeneous firms, such as Bombardini (2008) who demonstrates how cross-sectoral differences in firm het-
erogeneity can explain cross-sectoral differences in the level of trade protection. By assumption, taxes in
Bombardini (2008) cannot vary across firms. This is the variation that we are interested in. Likewise, our
analysis is related to a large body of work, synthesized in Helpman and Krugman (1989), that studies opti-
mal trade policy under imperfect competition, but abstracts from firm-level considerations.
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problems reduce to simple one-dimensional Lagrangian problems. Accordingly, whether
or not a government prefers to import or not reduces to comparing the value of that La-
grangian at an interior optimum and at a corner. Second, our approach is well suited to
accommodate rich general equilibrium interactions. Since our micro problems are inner
problems that take aggregate considerations as given, those can be added without mak-
ing the core of our analysis more complex nor affecting our main finding, as Section 6
formally demonstrates.
3 Baseline Environment
3.1 Technology, Preferences, and Market Structure
In our baseline analysis, we focus on a world economy with two countries, indexed by
i = H, F; one factor of production, labor; and a continuum of differentiated goods or
varieties. Labor is immobile across countries. wi and Li denote the wage and the inelastic
supply of labor in country i, respectively.
Technology. In each country there is a continuum of heterogeneous firms, each en-
dowed with a blueprint ϕ ∈ Φ. Ni denotes the total measure of firms in country i and Gi
denotes the distribution of blueprints ϕ across firms in that country. Each blueprint de-
scribes how to produce and deliver a firm’s differentiated variety to any country. lij(q, ϕ)
denotes the total amount of labor needed by a firm from country i with blueprint ϕ in
order to produce and deliver q ≥ 0 units in country j. We assume
lij(q, ϕ) =
aij(ϕ)q + fij(ϕ) if q > 0,0 if q = 0.
Technology in Krugman (1980) corresponds to the special case in which Gi has all its
mass at a single blueprint with zero fixed costs of selling in the two markets, fij = 0 for
all i, j. Technology in Melitz (2003) corresponds to the special case in which firms have
heterogeneous productivity, but face homogenous iceberg trade costs, aij(ϕ) ≡ τij/ϕ,
and homogenous fixed costs, fij(ϕ) ≡ fij for all ϕ ∈ R+. Here, we do not restrict ϕ
to be one-dimensional. Instead we let Φ be any measurable subset of R+4, with ϕ =
(ϕ1, ϕ2, ϕ3, ϕ4) ∈ Φ such that aii(ϕ) = ϕ1, aij(ϕ) = ϕ2, fii(ϕ) = ϕ3, and fij(ϕ) = ϕ4 for
i 6= j, i = H, F. It follows that the joint distribution of variable and fixed costs across firms
and destinations is completely unrestricted in our analysis. For instance, conditional on a
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given level of variable costs aij(ϕ) = a, fixed costs fij(ϕ) may be drawn from a log-normal
distribution, as in Eaton, Kortum and Kramarz (2011).
Preferences. In each country there is a representative agent with Constant Elasticity of
Substitution (CES) preferences, as in Krugman (1980) and Melitz (2003),





where qij(ϕ) is country j’s consumption of a variety with blueprint ϕ produced in country
i and µ ≡ σ/(σ− 1) with σ > 1 the elasticity of substitution between varieties. To prepare
our “micro to macro” analysis, it is convenient to rearrange the previous expression as a
two-level utility function,










where Qij is the subutility from consuming varieties from country i in country j.
Market Structure. All goods markets are monopolistically competitive. All labor mar-
kets are perfectly competitive. Foreign labor is our numeraire, wF = 1. In our baseline
analysis, we assume that entry is restricted so that Ni is exogenously given in all coun-
tries. In Section 6.1 we relax this assumption as well as the assumptions that labor is the
only factor of production, that there are only two countries, that cost functions are linear,
and that the elasticity of substitution across all goods is constant.
3.2 Decentralized Equilibrium with Taxes
The focus of our baseline analysis is on a scenario where governments have access to a
full set of ad-valorem consumption and production taxes. That is, we let taxes vary across
markets and across firms.4
4We view the availability of a rich set of ad-valorem taxes as a useful benchmark. In theory, there is a
priori no reason within the model that we consider why different goods should face the same taxes. In an
Arrow-Debreu economy, imposing the same taxes on arbitrary subsets of goods would be ad-hoc. Changing
the market structure from perfect to monopolistic competition does not make it less so. In practice, different
firms do face different trade taxes, even within the same narrowly defined industry. Take, for instance,
“Cotton, not carded or combed” (HS8 520100). As Kim (2017) notes, the most favoured nation (MFN) tariff
rate applied by the United States for firms producing “Cotton, not carded or combed, having staple length
of 28.575 mm or more but under 34.925 mm (HS8 52010038)” is 14%, as of 2013, whereas “Cotton, not carded
or combed, having a staple length under 19.05mm (3/4 inch), harsh or rough (HS8 52010005)” is duty free.
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Formally, we let tij(ϕ) denote the tax charged by country j on the consumption in
country j of a variety with blueprint ϕ produced in country i. Let sij(ϕ) denote the subsidy
paid by country i on the production by a domestic firm of a variety with blueprint ϕ sold
in country j. For i 6= j, tij(ϕ) > 0 corresponds to an import tariff while tij(ϕ) < 0
corresponds to an import subsidy. Similarly, sij(ϕ) > 0 corresponds to an export subsidy
while sij(ϕ) < 0 corresponds to an export tax. Tax revenues are rebated to domestic
consumers through a lump-sum transfer, Ti. We consider alternative tax instruments in
Section 6.2.
In a decentralized equilibrium with taxes, consumers choose consumption to maxi-
mize their utility subject to their budget constraint; firms choose their output to maxi-
mize profits, taking their residual demand curves as given; markets clear; and the gov-
ernment’s budget is balanced in each country. Let p̄ij(ϕ) ≡ µwiaij(ϕ)/(1 + sij(ϕ)) and
q̄ij(ϕ) ≡ [(1 + tij(ϕ)) p̄ij(ϕ)/Pij]−σQij. Using the previous notation, we can characterize
a decentralized equilibrium with taxes as schedules of output, qij ≡ {qij(ϕ)}, schedules
of prices, pij ≡ {pij(ϕ)}, aggregate output levels, Qij, aggregate price indices, Pij, wages,
wi, and aggregate profits, Πi, such that
qij(ϕ) =
q̄ij(ϕ) if µaij(ϕ)q̄ij(ϕ) ≥ lij(q̄ij(ϕ), ϕ),0 otherwise, (1)
pij(ϕ) =
 p̄ij(ϕ) if µaij(ϕ)qij(ϕ) ≥ lij(qij(ϕ), ϕ),∞ otherwise, (2)
QHj, QFj ∈ arg max
Q̃Hj,Q̃Fj




Ni[(1 + tij(ϕ))pij(ϕ)]1−σdGi(ϕ), (4)
Πi = Ni ∑j=H,F
∫
Φ
[µwiaij(ϕ)qij(ϕ)− wilij(qij(ϕ), ϕ)]dGi(ϕ), (5)











Condition (2) will play a central role in our analysis. It states that firms charge a constant
markup over a constant marginal cost whenever they sell in a destination, but that they
only do so if their profits are non-negative. This makes selection into exports the sole
channel through which governments may manipulate import prices across foreign firms.5
5Conditions (1) and (2) assume that firms that are indifferent between producing and not producing,
7
Throughout our analysis, we restrict attention to the interesting nontrivial cases where
the utility maximization problem (3) admits an interior solution. This rules out equilibria
without trade (QFH = QHF = 0) or without domestic production (QHH = QFF = 0).6
3.3 Unilaterally Optimal Taxation
We assume that the government of country H, which we refer to as Home’s government,
is strategic, whereas the government of country F, which we refer to as Foreign’s gov-
ernment, is passive. Section 6.3 will analyze the Nash equilibrium of the simultaneous
game in which both countries behave strategically. For now, Home’s government sets ad-
valorem taxes, tHH ≡ {tHH(ϕ)}, tFH ≡ {tFH(ϕ)}, sHH ≡ {sHH(ϕ)}, and sHF ≡ {sHF(ϕ)},
and a lump-sum transfer TH in order to maximize home welfare, whereas Foreign’s gov-
ernment sets all taxes to zero. Throughout our analysis, we simply refer to the problem
of Home’s government as Home’s problem.




subject to conditions (1)-(7).
The goal of the next two sections is to characterize unilaterally optimal taxes, i.e., taxes
that prevail at a solution to Home’s problem. To do so we follow the public finance lit-
erature and use the primal approach. Namely, we will first approach the optimal policy
problem of Home’s government in terms of a relaxed planning problem in which domes-
tic consumption and output can be chosen directly (Section 4). We will then establish
that the optimal allocation can be implemented through linear taxes and characterize the
structure of these taxes (Section 5).
produce. This is without loss of generality since, to simplify, we assume indifference is measure zero. We
do so by adopting the sufficient condition that conditional on a positive value for the fixed cost fij > 0 the
distribution over the variable cost aij is continuous. This condition rules out mass points but only for strictly
positive fixed costs. The distribution conditional on fij = 0 for aij may have mass points. Thus, the model
in Krugman (1980), which has no heterogeneity but no fixed costs of exporting, satisfies our requirement.
6Given the assumption that preferences are CES, this is a mild restriction. It states that for any given
origin country i and destination country j, there is a strictly positive measure of firms with variable and
fixed costs that are low enough to make non-negative profits.
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4 Micro and Macro Planning Problems
In this section, we focus on a relaxed version of Home’s problem that abstracts from
all constraints in which Home’s tax instruments, TH, {tjH, sHj}j=H,F, and Home’s prices,
wH, {pHj}j=H,F, appear. This relaxed problem can be interpreted as the problem of a
fictitious planner who directly controls the quantities demanded by home consumers,
qHH ≡ {qHH(ϕ)} and qFH ≡ {qFH(ϕ)}, as well as the quantities exported by home
firms, qHF ≡ {qHF(ϕ)}. Specifically, we drop conditions (2), (5), and (7) for i = H; we





ij , for i = H or j = H. (8)
We refer to this new problem as Home’s relaxed planning problem; see Appendix A.
In order to solve this relaxed problem, we take advantage of the nested structure of
preferences in this economy and follow a three-step approach. First, we take Home’s
local output, QHH, and exports, QHF, as given and solve for the domestic micro quanti-
ties, {qHj}j=H,F, that deliver these macro quantities at the lowest possible cost. Second,
we solve for Foreign’s micro quantities, {qFj}j=H,F, as well its domestic sales, QFF, that
maximize Home’s imports QFH conditional on its exports QHF. Third, we solve for the
optimal macro quantities, QHH, QFH, and QHF. The solution to these micro and macro
problems will determine the optimal micro and macro taxes, respectively, in Section 5.7
4.1 First Micro Problem: Home’s Production Possibility Frontier
Consider the problem of minimizing the labor cost of producing QHH units of aggregate
consumption for Home and QHF units of aggregate consumption for Foreign subject to
condition (8) for i = H and j = H, F. This can be expressed as









Hj , for j = H, F. (9b)
7Together with the foreign equilibrium conditions, the previous variables determine all foreign prices
at the solution of Home’s relaxed planning problem. For expositional purposes, we omit the description of
these variables from the main text and present them in Appendix A.2.
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Together with Home’s resource constraint, i.e., condition (6) for i = H, the previous value
function will characterize Home’s production possibility frontier.
This minimization problem is infinite dimensional and non-smooth. More precisely,
since there are fixed costs, the objective function is neither continuous nor convex around
qHj(ϕ) = 0 for any ϕ such that fHj(ϕ) > 0. To deal with the previous issues and derive
necessary properties that any solution to (9) must satisfy, we adopt the following strategy.
First, we consider a planning problem that extends (9) by allowing for randomiza-
tion: conditional on ϕ, we let the planner select a distribution of output levels.8 Since this
problem is convex, we can invoke Lagrangian necessity theorems. We then show that
randomization is not employed at any solution to the extended problem, so that the plan-
ner effectively solves (9). It follows that any solution to (9) must minimize the associated
Lagrangian,








for some Lagrange multipliers, λHj > 0, for j = H, F. The complete argument can be
found in Appendix A.1.9
Second, we use the additive separability of the Lagrangian LH in {qHj(ϕ)} to mini-
mize it variety-by-variety and market-by-market, as in Everett (1963). Although the dis-
continuity at zero remains, it is just a series of one-dimensional minimization problems





The solution to this problem follows a simple cut-off rule, which must then apply to any
solution, qHj(ϕ|QHH, QHF), to the original constrained problem (9),
qHj(ϕ|QHH, QHF) =
{
(µaHj(ϕ)/λHj)−σ, if ϕ ∈ ΦHj,
0, otherwise,
(10)
8There are two interpretations of this randomization. In the first, a firm with a blueprint ϕ is randomly
assigned a q according to this conditional distribution; in the second, there is a continuum of firms for
a given ϕ and each firm is assigned a different q so that the population is distributed according to the
conditional distribution.
9An alternative strategy would be to show that there exists a solution to the Lagrangian problem that
satisfies constraint (9b) and then invoke Lagrangian sufficiency theorems. For this first micro problem, this
is not more complex than our approach using randomization and Lagrangian necessity theorems. For the
next micro problem, however, the latter approach is the only one that we have been able to implement.
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with ΦHj ≡ {ϕ : (µ− 1)aHj(ϕ)(µaHj(ϕ)/λHj)−σ ≥ fHj(ϕ)} the set of domestically pro-
duced varieties sold in country j.10
By comparing equations (1), (2), and (4), on the one hand, and equations (9b) and (10),
on the other hand, one can check that conditional on QHH and QHF, the output levels in
the decentralized equilibrium with zero taxes and the solution to the relaxed planning
problem coincide. This reflects the efficiency of firm’s level decision under monopolistic
competition with Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) utility conditional on industry
size; see Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) and Dhingra and Morrow (2019) for closed economy ver-
sions of this result. As shown in Section 5, this feature implies that the home government
may want to impose a uniform import tariff or an export tax—in order to manipulate the
fraction of labor allocated to domestic production rather than exports—but that it never
wants to impose taxes that vary across domestic firms, regardless of whether they sell on
the domestic or foreign market.
4.2 Second Micro Problem: Foreign’s Offer Curve
Next consider the problem of maximizing Home’s imports, QFH(QHF), conditional on its
aggregate exports, QHF, subject to Foreign’s equilibrium conditions, namely conditions
(1) and (4) for i = F and j = F, (2), (5), (6) for i = F, and (3) for j = F. As shown in
Appendix A.2, this second micro problem can be reduced to








[µaFH(ϕ)qFH(ϕ)]dGF(ϕ) = PFF(QFF)MRSF(QHF, QFF)QHF, (11b)




µaFH(ϕ)qFH(ϕ) ≥ lFH(qFH(ϕ), ϕ), (11d)
where MRSF(QHF, QFF) ≡ (QHF/QFF)−1/σ denotes the marginal rate of substitution in
Foreign, LFF(QFF) denotes the total employment associated with the local sales of foreign
firms, and PFF(QFF) denotes the price index for domestic goods within Foreign. Con-
straint (11b) is a trade balance condition that equalizes the value of Home’s imports, on
the left-hand side, with the value of its exports, on the right-hand side.11 Constraint (11c)
10Given the previous definition, equation (10) implies that when indifferent between producing or not,
the planner chooses producing. Since indifference is measure zero, this is without loss of generality.
11 Utility maximization in Foreign implies PHF = PFF MRSF.
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is Foreign’s labor market clearing condition. Together with the new utility constraint (8)
for i = F and j = H, the value function in (11) will characterize Foreign’s offer curve.
It is convenient to focus first on the subproblem that takes both QHF and QFF as given
and maximizes over qFH. To deal with the non-smoothness and non-convexities of this
minimization problem and derive necessary properties that any of its solution must sat-
isfy, we can follow a similar strategy as in Section 4.1. Technical details can again be found
in Appendix A.2.
Consider the one-dimensional subproblem of finding the amount of foreign imports
of variety ϕ that solves
max
q
q1/µ − λTµaFH(ϕ)q− λLlFH(q, ϕ) (12a)
µaFH(ϕ)q ≥ lFH(q, ϕ), (12b)
where λT and λL are the Lagrange multipliers associated with (11b) and (11c). The solu-
tion to the unconstrained problem, ignoring inequality (12b), is given by
quFH(ϕ) =
{




with θFH(ϕ) ≡ [(µ− 1)(aFH(ϕ))1−σ/ fFH(ϕ)]1/σ/µ and χFH ≡ λL + µλT > 0.12 In what
follows, we refer to θFH(ϕ) as the “profitability” of foreign varieties in Home’s market,
which decreases with both their fixed costs, fFH(ϕ), and their variable costs, aFH(ϕ). If
quFH(ϕ) satisfies constraint (12b), then it is also a solution to (12). If it does not, then the
solution to (12) is given either by zero or by qcFH(ϕ) > q
u
FH(ϕ) such that (12b) exactly
binds, with qcFH(ϕ) given by
qcFH(ϕ) = fFH(ϕ)/((µ− 1)aFH(ϕ)).
The former case occurs if (qcFH(ϕ))
1/µ − χFHaFH(ϕ)qcFH(ϕ) − λL fFH(ϕ) < 0, while the
latter case occurs otherwise.
Based on the previous observations, we can express the solution to our second micro
12χFH > 0 is necessary for the solution of the Lagrangian problem to satisfy constraints (11b) and (11c).
Since λL and λT are associated with equality constraints, however, we cannot rule out at this point that one
of these two multipliers is negative. We come back to this issue in detail below.
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problem in a compact way as
qFH(ϕ|QHF, QFF) =

(µχFHaFH(ϕ))−σ , if ϕ ∈ ΦuFH,
fFH(ϕ)/((µ− 1)aFH(ϕ)) , if ϕ ∈ ΦcFH,
0 , otherwise,
(13)
with the two sets of imported varieties defined by
ΦuFH ≡ {ϕ : θFH(ϕ) ∈ [(max{λL/(λL + µλT), 1})1/σ(λL + µλT), ∞)},
ΦcFH ≡ {ϕ : θFH(ϕ) ∈ [λL + λT, λL + µλT)}.
Given a solution to the inner problem, {qFH(ϕ|QHF, QFF)}, the optimal level of local out-
put in Foreign, QFF(QHF), can be solved for in a standard manner. The optimal micro
quantities are then given by qFH(ϕ|QHF) ≡ qFH(ϕ|QFF(QHF)). Substituting into (11a),
we obtain Foreign offer’s curve, QFH(QHF).
The set ΦcFH will play a key role in our subsequent analysis. For varieties ϕ ∈ ΦcFH,
Home finds it optimal to raise its imports in order to make sure that the least profitable
firms in Foreign are willing to produce and export strictly positive amounts, a situation
that we will refer to as positive discrimination. As can be seen from the above expres-
sion, whether or not ΦcFH is empty boils down to whether the Lagrange multiplier on the
trade balance condition, λT, is strictly positive.13At the optimal level of exports, which
we characterize next, we will demonstrate that this is necessarily the case.
4.3 Macro Problem: Manipulating Aggregate Terms-of-Trade
Finally, consider the choice of macro quantities, (QHH, QFH, QHF), that maximize UH sub-
ject to the last two constraints of Home’s relaxed planning problem: Home’s resource
constraint, i.e., condition (6) for i = H, and the new utility constraint (8) for i = F and
j = H. Given the analysis of Sections 4.1 and 4.2, these two constraints (6) and (8) can
be expressed as LH(QHH, QHF) = LH and QFH(QFF) ≥ QFH. Thus, optimal aggregate
13If it is, then λL + µλT must also be strictly greater than λL + λT . The profitability cut-off between
ΦuFH and Φ
c




FH(ϕ). If instead λT ≤ 0,
then λL + µλT ≤ λL + λT , ΦcFH is empty, and the lowest profitability level in ΦuFH is given by θFH(ϕ) =
λ1/σL (λL + µλT)
1/µ, at which point the Lagrangian in (12) is equal to zero.
13




QFH ≤ QFH(QHF), (14b)
LH(QHH, QHF) = LH. (14c)
At this point, it should be clear that we are back to a standard terms-of-trade manipula-
tion problem with the combinations of Foreign’s offer curve (constraint 14b) and Home’s
production possibility frontier (constraint 14c) determining Home’s Consumption Possi-
bility Frontier, as in Baldwin (1948). Like in a perfectly competitive model of international
trade, foreign technology, endowments, and preferences only matter through their com-
bined effect on Foreign’s offer curve, the elasticity of which will determine the aggregate
level of trade protection.
To characterize the solution of Home’s macro problem (14), let us define Home’s ag-
gregate terms-of-trade as,
P(QFH, QHF) ≡ PHF(QHF)/P̃FH(QHF, QFH),
where PHF(QHF) and P̃FH(QHF, QFH) are the price of Home’s exports and the average
cost of Home’s imports, respectively,
PHF(QHF) = PFF(QFF(QHF))MRSF(QHF, QFF(QHF)),




The tilde symbol emphasizes the fact that the import price index, PFH, faced by Home’s
consumer in the decentralized equilibrium will differ from P̃FH(QHF, QFH): the former
is inclusive of trade taxes, whereas the latter is not. As shown in Appendix A.3, at an






where MRS∗H ≡ (Q∗HH/Q∗FH)−1/σ and MRT∗H ≡ (∂LH/∂QHH)/(∂LH/∂QHF) are the
marginal rate of substitution and marginal rate of transformation in Home, respectively,
and η∗ ≡ d ln QFH/d ln QHF is the elasticity of Foreign’s offer curve, all evaluated at the
solution to the macro problem.
The left-hand side of equation (15) describes the ratio between the relative price of
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Home’s aggregate exports before taxes, P∗ = P(Q∗FH, Q
∗
HF), and the same relative price
after taxes, which is equal to MRS∗H/MRT
∗
H in the decentralized equilibrium. At an opti-
mum, the wedge between these two prices, P∗/(MRS∗H/MRT
∗
H)− 1, should be equal to
1/η∗ − 1. This is the standard optimal tariff formula in a two-good neoclassical economy,
as described in Dixit (1985).
4.4 The Case for Positive Discrimination
We are ready to come back to the issue of whether the solution to Home’s relaxed plan-
ning problem exhibits positive discrimination.
Mathematically, establishing positive discrimination is formally equivalent to estab-
lishing that, at the optimum, λT > 0. We do so by contradiction. Suppose that λT ≤ 0.
Then starting from an optimum, consider a small decrease in aggregate exports, QHF,
accompanied by adjustments in both domestic output and imports, QHH and QFH, such
that constraints (14b) and (14c) continue to hold. The increase in QHH creates a first-order














This deviation therefore strictly increases Home’s utility, thereby contradicting the opti-
mality of the original allocation.
To gain intuition about why positive discrimination occurs at an optimum, it is easiest
to start with a small open economy, by which we mean an economy that is too small to
affect labor demand in the rest of the world. For such an economy, our second micro
problem reduces to








pFH(qFH(ϕ); ϕ)qFH(ϕ)dGF(ϕ) = PFF(QFF)MRSF(QHF, QFF)QHF,
with the import prices of foreign varieties such that
pFH(q; ϕ) =
{
µaFH(ϕ), if µaFH(ϕ)q ≥ lFH(q, ϕ),
∞, otherwise.
(16)










Figure 1: The Case for Positive Discrimination
taking prices as given, Home’s government internalizes the fact that import prices are a
decreasing function of import quantities. For the prices of imports pFH(q; ϕ) to be equal
to µaFH(ϕ), imports must be large enough for foreigners’ profits to be non-negative. As
a result, Home’s government may choose to buy more than the unconstrained level of
output, quFH(ϕ), in order induce firms to self-select into exports.
These considerations are illustrated in Figure 1, where we have plotted the marginal
utility of importing a foreign variety, q−1/σFH (ϕ)/λT, as well as its marginal costs from
the point of view of Home’s government, µaFH(ϕ), and the foreign firm, aFH(ϕ). To in-
duce foreign firms to export, Home’s government may choose to raise their profits by
the rectangle with area [(µ − 1)aFH(ϕ)] × [qcFH(ϕ) − quFH(ϕ)]. The associated benefit is
the Dupuit triangle given by the consumer surplus generated by an extra variety, similar
to Romer (1994), whereas the cost is the Harberger triangle associated with the purchase
of qcFH(ϕ)− quFH(ϕ) units whose marginal benefits are below their marginal costs. For a
marginal variety, for which profits at the unconstrained level of output are almost zero,
the benefit always exceeds the cost, hence it is optimal to subsidize imports up to qcFH(ϕ).
The required subsidy increases as profitability falls, hence inducing positive discrimina-
tion, which ends when fixed costs are so large that the increase in output required for
firms to break even leads to a Harberger triangle with area equal to the Dupuit triangle.
Away from the small open economy case, Home’s government further internalizes the
fact that any increase in imports must be accompanied by an increase in foreign labor de-
mand, which will, in turn, affect the level of local output abroad, QFF, and Home’s terms
of trade, PFF(QFF)MRSF(QHF, QFF). This creates a second reason for the government to
take into account the fixed costs of exporting, above and beyond the non-negativity of for-
eigners’ export profits. Now when deciding whether or not it is worth expanding output
beyond its unconstrained level, Home must compare the difference between the Dupuit
and Harberger triangle to the shadow cost of raising foreign labor demand by fFH(ϕ). As
16
formally shown above, however, this general equilibrium consideration can never offset
the previous partial equilibrium rationale for positive discrimination.
Because Home’s government always takes into account the shadow cost of its im-
port decisions on its trade balance condition, λT > 0, it does not behave like a global
social planner, but instead underweights the fixed cost of importing, which only enters
constraint (11c), whereas the associated marginal cost enters constraints (11b) and (11c).
Thus, for a marginal variety, if foreign firms are indifferent between exporting or not at
the unconstrained level of output, Home’s government must strictly prefer to import.14
At a global level, this creates Pareto inefficiencies, with Foreign producing too much of the
high fixed-cost varieties associated with low profits (in Foreign) and low social surplus
(for the world as a whole), but high consumer surplus (at Home).
5 Optimal Taxes
We have derived three necessary conditions—equations (10), (13), and (15)—that micro
quantities, {q∗HH(ϕ) ≡ qHH(ϕ|Q∗HH, Q∗HF)}, {q∗HF(ϕ) ≡ qHF(ϕ|Q∗HH, Q∗HF)}, {q∗FH(ϕ) ≡
qFH(ϕ|Q∗HF)}, and macro quantities, Q∗HH, Q∗HF, and Q∗FH, solving Home’s relaxed plan-
ning problem must satisfy. We now use these conditions to derive necessary proper-
ties that ad-valorem taxes implementing such a solution must satisfy (Sections 5.1-5.3).
We will then use these properties to establish the existence of such taxes (Section 5.4).
Since they replicate the solution to Home’s relaxed planning problem, they a fortiori solve
Home’s original problem in Definition 1.
5.1 Micro-level Taxes on Domestic Varieties
Consider first a schedule of domestic taxes, {s∗HH(ϕ)} and {t∗HH(ϕ)}, that implements the
optimal micro quantities, {q∗HH(ϕ)}. Fix a benchmark variety ϕHH that is sold domesti-
cally, q∗HH(ϕHH) > 0. Denote by s
∗
HH ≡ s∗HH(ϕHH) and t∗HH ≡ t∗HH(ϕHH) the domestic
taxes imposed on that variety. Now take any other variety ϕ ∈ ΦHH that is sold domesti-











14In contrast, from the point of view of a global planner, the social surplus generated by a variety is
always proportional to the profits of the firm. So whenever firms are indifferent between exporting or not,
a global planner would be indifferent as well.
17
Combining this expression with equation (10), we obtain our first result.
Lemma 1. In order to implement an allocation solving the relaxed planning problem, domestic






if ϕ ∈ ΦHH. (17)
While we have focused on domestic taxes, there is nothing in the previous proposition
that hinges on domestic varieties being sold in the domestic market rather than abroad.
Thus, we can use the exact same argument to characterize the structure of export taxes,
{s∗HF(ϕ)}, that implements {q∗HF(ϕ)}. In line with the previous analysis, let ϕHF denote
a benchmark variety that is exported, with s∗HF ≡ s∗HF(ϕHF). The following result must
hold.
Lemma 2. In order to implement an allocation solving the relaxed planning problem, export taxes
should be such that
s∗HF(ϕ) = s
∗
HF if ϕ ∈ ΦHF. (18)
5.2 Micro-level Taxes on Foreign Varieties
Now consider a schedule of import taxes, {t∗FH(ϕ)}, that implements the desired alloca-
tion, {q∗FH(ϕ)}. Fix a benchmark variety ϕFH ∈ ΦuFH that is imported. In line with our
previous analysis, let t∗FH ≡ t∗FH(ϕFH) denote the import tax imposed on that benchmark



















This leads to our third result.
Lemma 3. In order to implement an allocation solving the relaxed planning problem, import taxes
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should be such that








− 1 if ϕ ∈ ΦFH, (20)
with the profitability index θFH(ϕ) ≡ [(µ− 1)(aFH(ϕ))1−σ/ fFH(ϕ)]1/σ/µ.
5.3 Overall Level of Taxes
Our next goal is to determine the overall level of taxes that is necessary for a decentral-
ized equilibrium to implement the desired allocation. In Sections 5.1 and 5.2, we have






HF. So, this boils
down to characterizing these four taxes. To do so, we compare the ratio between the
marginal rates of substitution at home and abroad, evaluated at the solution to Home’s
relaxed planning problem, and their ratio in the decentralized equilibrium with taxes. As
formally established in Appendix B.1, this leads to the following necessary condition.
Lemma 4. In order to implement an allocation solving the relaxed planning problem, the overall






HF, should be such that
(1 + t∗FH)/(1 + t
∗
HH)


























According to Lemma 4, if the foreign distribution of blueprints GF is such that ΦcFH is




= 1 for almost all ϕ ∈ΦFH, optimal import taxes are
uniform, and equation (21) reduces to
(1 + t∗FH)/(1 + t
∗
HH)




This is what would happen in the absence of fixed exporting costs, as in Krugman (1980).15
If instead ΦcFH is not measure zero then µ > 1 implies
(1 + t∗FH)/(1 + t
∗
HH)




This derives from our choice of benchmark variety for imports. t∗FH is the tax on varieties
ϕ ∈ ΦuFH, and we know from Lemma 3 that import taxes should be lower on varieties
15In Section 4.4, we have established that ΦcFH is not empty. For degenerate distributions GF, however,
our analytical results do not rule out the possibility that the measure of blueprints in ΦcFH is zero.
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ϕ ∈ ΦcFH. So in order to implement a wedge equal to η∗, the domestic government must
now impose import taxes on varieties ϕ ∈ ΦuFH that, relative to other taxes, are strictly
greater than 1/η∗.16
5.4 Implementation
Lemmas 1-4 provide necessary conditions that linear taxes have to satisfy so that the
decentralized equilibrium replicates a solution to the relaxed planning problem. In the
next lemma, which is proven in Appendix B.2, we show that that if the previous taxes
are augmented with high enough taxes on the goods that are not consumed, ϕ /∈ ΦHH,
ϕ /∈ ΦHF, and ϕ /∈ ΦFH, then they are also sufficient to implement any allocation that
solves the relaxed planning problem.
Lemma 5. There exists a decentralized equilibrium with taxes that implements any allocation that
solves the relaxed planning problem.
Since Home’s relaxed planning problem is, as its name indicates, a relaxed version of
Home’s problem in Definition 1, the taxes associated with a decentralized equilibrium
that implements a solution to the relaxed planning problem must a fortiori solve Home’s
problem. Lemmas 2-5 therefore imply that any taxes that solve Home’s problem must
satisfy conditions (17), (18), (20), and (21). To summarize, we can characterize unilaterally
optimal taxes as follows.
Proposition 1. At the micro-level, unilaterally optimal taxes are such that: (i) domestic taxes
are uniform across all domestic producers (condition 17); (ii) export taxes are uniform across all
exporters (condition 18); (iii) import taxes are uniform across Foreign’s most profitable exporters
and strictly increasing with profitability across its least profitable ones (condition 20). At the
macro-level, unilaterally optimal taxes reflect aggregate terms-of-trade considerations (condition
21).
Figure 2 illustrates our main findings graphically. The left panel (Figure 2a) describes the
structure of optimal export taxes, with the grey area representing the region of no exports,
while the right panel (Figure 2b) describes the structure of optimal import taxes, with the
grey area representing the region of no imports.
16Using the characterization of micro-level quantities, one can also solve for η∗ as a function of the
Lagrange multipliers λL and λT . This leads to
(1 + t∗FH)/(1 + t
∗
HH)








For a small open economy, λL → 0, this simplifies into Gros’s (1987) formula. We come back to this connec-






















(b) Discriminatory Import Taxes
Figure 2: Optimal Trade Taxes
In Figure 2, we have chosen to let both the overall level of export and import taxes
s∗HF and t
∗
FH be non-zero. Note, however, that condition (21) only pins down the relative
levels of optimal taxes. Thus, for example, if domestic and export taxes were constrained




HF = 0, the characterization of optimal taxes in Proposition 1
























Alternatively, one could also impose a uniform export tax, while setting the overall level




FH = 0. This is an expression of Lerner symme-
try, which must still hold under monopolistic competition, as discussed in Costinot and
Werning (2019). Under such an implementation, all varieties ϕ ∈ ΦcFH would have to
receive an import subsidy equal to θFH(ϕ)/(λL + µλT)− 1 < 0, which is decreasing in
profitability. As alluded to in Section 4.1, the fact that domestic taxes can be dispensed
with derives from the efficiency of the decentralized equilibrium with monopolistic com-
petition and CES utility. Here, as in Bhagwati (1971), trade taxes are the preferred instru-
ments to exploit monopoly and monopsony power in world markets.
5.5 Firm Heterogeneity, Selection into Exports, and Trade Policy
Since large firms export, whereas small firms do not, it might be tempting to conclude
that what policy makers should do is help small firms export as well. As a case in point,
the World Trade Report mentioned in Section 2, is entitled “Leveling the Trading Field
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for SMEs”. The canonical model of trade with self-selection of firms into exports that we
have analyzed offers a very different perspective.
From the point of view of a government that unilaterally imposes trade taxes to max-
imize domestic welfare, Proposition 1 indicates that there is no reason to subsidize the
exports of the least profitable domestic firms. Rather, such a government should subsi-
dize the imports of the least profitable foreign firms. Though these prescriptions may
run counter to popular narratives about the perceived needs for subsidizing domestic
SMEs, the general principle behind our conclusions is an old one. If world prices vary
with quantities, but private agents are price-takers, a country should exercise its market
power to improve its terms-of-trade, as originally noted by Torrens (1844) and Mill (1844)
and later formalized by Johnson (1953).17 This is true here at the micro-level, where the
price of individual varieties pFH(q; ϕ) in equation (16) is a function of import quantities,
and this is also true at the macro level, where the elasticity of Foreign’s offer curve may
differ from one. The selection of heterogeneous firms into exports, however, flips the
monotonicity of the relationship between prices and quantities. At the micro-level, prices
fall as imports raise to the point where foreign exporters become profitable, which calls
for import subsidies rather than taxes.
In contrast to the equivalence result of Arkolakis, Costinot and Rodríguez-Clare (2012),
micro-level considerations here lead to very different policy recommendations between
Ricardian models, such as Eaton and Kortum (2002), and monopolistically competitive
models, such as Melitz (2003). In a Ricardian economy, Costinot, Donaldson, Vogel and
Werning (2015) find that optimal export taxes should be heterogeneous across goods,
whereas optimal import tariffs should be uniform. This is the exact opposite of what
Proposition 1 describes. In a Ricardian economy, goods exported by domestic firms could
also be produced by foreign firms. This threat of entry limits the ability of the home gov-
ernment to manipulate prices and leads to lower export taxes on “marginal” goods. Since
this threat is absent here, optimal export taxes are uniform instead. On the import side,
lower tariffs on “marginal” goods under monopolistic competition derive from the exis-
tence of fixed exporting costs, which are necessarily absent under perfect competition.
17Bagwell and Staiger (2002) offer an overview of the optimal tariff argument and its implications for the
design of trade agreements under perfect competition. Ossa (2011) and Bagwell and Staiger (2012b,a, 2015)
discuss whether imperfect competition creates a new rationale for the design of trade agreements.
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6 Robustness
The previous analysis makes a number of standard, but strong assumptions. An attrac-
tive feature of our method is that it can easily accommodate more general environments.
At a technical level, since we focus on inner problems, making the outer problem more
complex—because a government may now take into account how its trade taxes affect
relative factor prices around the world, demand across industries, or entry—does little to
complicate our analysis. In this section, we use this flexibility to establish the robustness
of our main findings. To save on space, we focus on sketching alternative environments
and summarizing their main implications. A detailed analysis can be found in our Online
Appendix
6.1 Economic Environment
Technology. Consider first a strict generalization of our baseline environment with mul-
tiple factors of production indexed by n. Li ≡ {Li,n} ≥ 0 now denotes the exogenous
vector of factor endowments in country i = H, F, whereas wi ≡ {wi,n} denotes the vector
of factor prices in country i. For each origin country i and destination country j, a firm
with blueprint ϕ that uses l ≡ {ln} units of the different factors can produce
qij(l, ϕ) =
(




where gij(·, ϕ) is homogeneous of degree one, strictly quasiconcave, and γij > −1/σ.
Firms choose their mix of factors to minimize their costs. This leads to the following
demand for factor n by a firm with blueprint ϕ from country i selling q units in country j:
lij,n(q, wi, ϕ) =
zij,n(wi, ϕ)[aij(ϕ)q1+γij + fij(ϕ)] if q > 0,0 otherwise,
where zij,n(wi, ϕ) denotes the solution to minl{wi · l|gij(l, ϕ) ≥ 1}.18 The environment of
Section 3 corresponds to the special case where firms may vary in terms of their variable
and fixed costs, aij(ϕ) and fij(ϕ), but there is a single factor, and marginal costs of pro-
duction are constant, γij = 0. Here, in contrast, firms may vary in their factor intensity, as
reflected in different zij(wi, ϕ), and, after overhead fixed costs have been paid, there are
18Without loss of generality, we normalize gij(l, ϕ) so that at the equilibrium vector of factor prices,
||zij(wi, ϕ)|| = 1 for all ϕ.
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still increasing or decreasing returns to scale if γij 6= 0.
In this environment, Online Appendix A shows that our characterization of micro-
level taxes continues to apply across firms with the same factor intensity. That is, for any
given set of firms with the same vector of factor demand zij(wi, ϕ), unilaterally optimal
taxes should be such that: (i) domestic taxes are uniform across all domestic produc-
ers; (ii) export taxes are uniform across all exporters; and (iii) import taxes are uniform
across Foreign’s most profitable exporters and strictly increasing with profitability across
its least profitable ones. If one defines an industry as a group of firms with the same factor
intensity, it follows that our previous results hold within each industry, though the level
of taxes may now vary across industries as well.
Two restrictions are critical for us to derive this generalized version of Proposition 1.
First, cost functions remain separable across markets, which we use to create separate
micro problems, like in our baseline analysis. Second, variable costs remain iso-elastic
functions of quantities, with the elasticity being common across varieties from the same
origin. If not, optimal import tariffs would also reflect differences in the ability to manip-
ulate import prices at different import volumes and, in turn, lead to discriminatory tariffs
even when selection is not binding.
Preferences. Consider a strict generalization of our baseline environment where goods
may fall into different groups indexed by k. Within a group, we maintain the assumption
that preferences are CES, but we do not impose any restriction on the pattern of substi-
tution across these groups. Formally, the utility function of the representative agent in
country j is now given by









with Qkij the subutility from consuming varieties from country i and group k in country j,
µk ≡ σk/(σk − 1), and σk > 1. The environment of Section 3 corresponds to the special
case in which there is only one group and Uj is CES.
Results in this environment echo those obtained under general technologies. As demon-
strated in Online Appendix B, our characterization of micro-level taxes continues to apply
across firms, but now for those operating within the same group k. In general, one can
therefore view the characterization presented in Proposition 1 as a robust “intra-industry”
prediction about how the level of trade taxes should vary (or not) with the profitability of
firms operating in that industry. This is true regardless of whether one defines an indus-
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try as a subset of firms with the same factor intensity, as we did above, or as a subset of
firms producing the same group of goods, as in the present extension.19 Compared to our
baseline analysis, as well as the previous and subsequent extensions, the only difference
is that we can no longer rule out situations where the set of foreign firms for which there
is positive discrimination is empty. Formally, the case for positive discrimination relies
on the Lagrange multiplier on Home’s trade balance condition being strictly positive, i.e.,
Home not having incentives to run a trade surplus and transfer money to Foreign. With
general preferences, we cannot rule out such “transfer paradoxes”, as in Leontief (1936)
and Samuelson (1952).
Number of Countries. Consider a strict generalization of our baseline environment
with arbitrarily many countries. Home remains the only strategic country, whereas all
countries i 6= H are passive. This extension can be thought of as a combination of our two
previous generalizations, with each country being endowed with a different factor and
producing goods in a different group. In this environment, Online Appendix C shows
that Proposition 1 generalizes as follows: (i) domestic taxes are uniform across all do-
mestic producers; (ii) for any given destination country, export taxes are uniform across
all domestic exporters; and (iii) for any given origin country, import taxes are uniform
across the most profitable exporters and strictly increasing with profitability across the
least profitable ones. The “within-country” qualification is the counterpart of the “intra-
industry” qualifications in our two previous extensions.
Free Entry Consider a strict generalization of our baseline environment with free entry.
In each country, there is a potentially large number of firms that may decide whether
to enter or not. As in Melitz (2003), we assume that in order to enter, firms must pay
some overhead fixed cost. Once the overhead fixed cost has been paid, firms randomly
draw a blueprint ϕ ∈ Φ, with Gi the distribution of blueprints ϕ across firms in country
i. Compared to Melitz (2003), however, we let firms be ex-ante heterogeneous in terms
of their fixed entry costs, with Ni( f e) the measure of firms with entry costs below some
value f e. Free entry then requires the expected profits of the marginal firm to be equal to
its fixed entry cost,




19The two restrictions that are critical for this generalization also mirror those imposed above. First,
preferences are weakly separable across groups, so that we can study each of our micro problems separately.
Second, utility remains iso-elastic within each nest, so that markups remain constant and selection remains
the only source of terms-of-trade manipulation across foreign firms.
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with f ei (·) ≡ N
−1
i (·). This is the counterpart of equation (5) in our baseline analysis.
Melitz (2003) corresponds to the special case where the distribution of fixed entry costs
is degenerate, f ei (Ni) = f̄
e
i , so that entry is perfectly elastic, while our baseline analysis
corresponds to the special case where entry is perfectly inelastic. This generalization,
with a smooth distribution of fixed entry costs, nests these two extreme situations as limit
cases.
Online Appendix D shows that Proposition 1 continues to hold under free entry with-
out further qualifications. For a small open economy, the argument is exactly the same
as that in Section 4.4. For a large country, free entry creates new general equilibrium
considerations. In addition to manipulating its relative wage, Home can now manipu-
late the measure of foreign entrants, NF. This new channel, however, reinforces Home’s
incentives to tilt Foreign’s exports towards varieties with lower profitability. By doing
so, Home can reduce profits (gross of entry costs) and hence the equilibrium measure of
entrants in Foreign. Since the price of Foreign’s varieties abroad, PFF(QFF, NF), is decreas-
ing in NF, lowering the measure of foreign entrants raises the price of Home’s exports,
PFF(QFF, NF)MRSF(QHF, QFF), and relaxes Home’s trade balance condition, making pos-
itive discrimination again optimal.
6.2 Tax Instruments
Two-Part Tariffs. Our baseline analysis allows a rich set of linear taxes that may vary
across firms, but rules our the possibility of two-part tariffs. In addition to the ad-valorem
taxes available in Section 3, {sHj(ϕ), tjH(ϕ)}j=H,F, we now assume that Home’s govern-
ment also has access to firm-specific fixed fees, {s fHj(ϕ), t
f
jH(ϕ)}j=H,F. In order to sell any
amount in Home’s market, a firm with blueprint ϕ from country j needs to pay t fjH(ϕ).
Conversely, any firm from Home that sells any amount in market j receives s fHj(ϕ).
For domestic firms, the introduction of this new instrument does not affect any of
our results. Regardless of whether non-linear taxes are available, the cost of producing
QHH and QHF cannot be lower than LH(QHH, QHF). This implies that the solution to
Home’s planning problem is unaffected and, in turn, that optimal domestic and export
taxes remain uniform. Compared to our earlier analysis, the only difference is Foreign’s
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offer curve, which is now given by











FH(ϕ)]dGF(ϕ) = PFF(QFF)MRSF(QHF, QFF)QHF,






FH(ϕ) ≥ lFH(qFH(ϕ), ϕ).
In order to induce firms to self-select into exports, there is no longer a reason for Home to
create a Harberger triangle, as previously illustrated in Figure 1, since it now can simply
offer a fixed fee that brings total profits, inclusive of the fee, to zero at the unconstrained
level of imports,
t fFH(ϕ) = [µaFH(ϕ)q
u
FH(ϕ)− lFH(quFH(ϕ), ϕ)].
This again leads to positive discrimination in favor of the least profitable foreign firms,
but this now takes the form of lower fixed fees for these firms, as formally established in
Online Appendix E.
Uniform Tariffs. In our baseline analysis as well as in the previous extensions we have
characterized optimal trade policy under the assumption that the home government is
not only free to discriminate between firms from different countries by using trade taxes,
but also unlimited in its ability to discriminate between firms from the same country. In
practice, informational or legal constraints may place some constraints on this type of
taxation. Here, we turn to the other polar case in which the previous constraints are so
extreme that Home’s government must set uniform taxes: tHF(ϕ) = t̄HF, tHH(ϕ) = t̄HH,
sHF(ϕ) = s̄HF, and sHH(ϕ) = s̄HH for all ϕ.
Online Appendix F shows that optimal uniform taxes satisfy
(1 + t̄∗FH)/(1 + t̄
∗
HH)









where x∗FF denotes the share of expenditure on local goods by Foreign and κ
∗
F denotes
the elasticity, with respect to QFH, of the marginal rate of transformation between exports
and local goods in Foreign. Equation (22) is a strict generalization of the results of Gros
(1987), obtained in the case of homogeneous firms and no fixed exporting costs, for which
κ∗F = 0, and the results of Demidova and Rodríguez-Clare (2009) and Felbermayr, Jung




Figure 3: Firm Heterogeneity, Selection into Exports, and Aggregate Nonconvexities
and constant fixed exporting costs.20
Compared to prior parametric examples, our general analysis isolates aggregate non-
convexities as the key economic channel through which the self-selection of heteroge-
neous firms into exports tends to lower the overall level of trade protection. Whenever
selection is active, in the sense that there is positive density of foreign firms indifferent
between selling and not selling in at least one destination j = H, F, κ∗F is strictly negative
and the level of trade protection is lower than what it would have been if κ∗F = 0.
Like in our baseline analysis, selection does not affect the general rationale for trade
taxes: prices depend on quantities, which consumers and firms do not internalize. But
compared to a neoclassical environment, it creates a new force that tends to flip the sign of
the relationship between prices and quantities. Since Foreign’s aggregate production set
is not convex, as illustrated in Figure 3, a government may lower the price of its imports
by raising their volumes and inducing more foreign firms to become exporters, a force
towards subsidizing imports.21
20In this case we would have κ∗F = −
ν−(σ−1)
[σν−(σ−1)]x∗FF
< 0, with ν > σ− 1 the shape parameter of the Pareto
distribution, as discussed in Costinot, Rodríguez-Clare and Werning (2016).
21To isolate this mechanism, it is convenient to focus on a generalized version of our baseline analysis
where domestic and foreign varieties belong to two different CES nests, as in Costinot, Rodríguez-Clare
and Werning (2016). In this case, equation (22) generalizes to
(1 + t̄∗FH)/(1 + t̄
∗
HH)











where ε∗F denotes the upper-level elasticity of substitution between the domestic and foreign nests, which
is independent of κ∗F. When foreign preferences are linear, ε
∗
F → ∞, the optimal level of trade protection
converges to κ∗F < 0. In this limit case, the last neoclassical force calling for an import tariff, diminishing
marginal rates of substitution in Foreign, is eliminated. More generally, an import subsidy is optimal if and
only if non-convexities on the supply-side dominate convexities on the demand-side, κ∗F < −1/(ε∗Fx∗FF).
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6.3 Nash Taxes
We now assume that both governments are strategic and simultaneously set their taxes,
taking the taxes of the other government as given. In Online Appendix G, we show that
our primal approach can be extended to study the Nash equilibrium of such games. For
each country, the idea is again to start by solving a fictitious planner’s problem, now
taking the vector of taxes in the other country as given, and then to characterize the taxes
that decentralize the solution to this planner’s problem. By construction, such taxes are
best-responses to the taxes in the other country.
In our baseline analysis, we have shown that Home has incentives to impose discrim-
inatory tariffs, which induce a sub-optimal allocation of foreign labor in terms of foreign
welfare. Now that Foreign can respond to Home’s policy, a natural conjecture is that it
will seek to undo the induced reallocation of labor towards its least profitable firms, per-
haps leading to a Nash allocation that remains the same as in the world’s first best. As
Online Appendix G formally demonstrates, this is not so. Just like in our baseline anal-
ysis, taxes at a Nash equilibrium are such that: (i) domestic taxes are uniform across all
domestic producers; (ii) export taxes are uniform across all exporters; and (iii) import
taxes are uniform across Foreign’s most profitable exporters and strictly increasing with
profitability across its least profitable ones.
In fact, Online Appendix G establishes that imposing uniform export taxes or subsi-
dies is a dominant strategy for both countries. From the point of view of Home’s gov-
ernment, discriminatory tariffs in Foreign act as heterogeneous demand shifters. Instead
of receiving export prices proportional to (qHF(ϕ))−1/σ, it now receives export prices
proportional to (qHF(ϕ))−1/σ/(1 + tHF(ϕ)). This is no different than the situation faced
by Home’s exporters who also face inverse demand curves given by (qHF(ϕ))−1/σ/(1 +
tHF(ϕ)). As a result, regardless of whether Foreign is passive or not, Home has no in-
centives to discriminate among its exporters. And for the same reason, Foreign has no
incentives to undo Home’s import subsidies on its least profitable exporters.
7 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have studied the policy implications of firms’ selection into exports in
the context of a canonical model of trade with firm heterogeneity à la Melitz (2003). A
number of robust and novel conclusions have emerged from our analysis.
First, from the point of view of a country that unilaterally imposes ad-valorem trade
taxes to maximize domestic welfare, it is optimal to subsidize the imports of the least prof-
29
itable foreign firms within each industry. When firms only export if they can sell enough,
an increase in imported quantities lowers the prices of the goods sold by firms that would
have not selected into exports otherwise, a form of terms-of-trade manipulation. Com-
pared to a standard neoclassical environment with diminishing marginal returns, how-
ever, import prices decrease rather than increase with import quantities. This creates a
motive for import subsidies rather than taxes on the least profitable foreign firms.
Second, from a unilateral standpoint, it is also optimal to impose export taxes or sub-
sidies that are uniform across all domestic firms within each industry. Unlike domes-
tic consumers that ignore that buying more from foreign firms may lower the domestic
prices that they face, domestic firms fully internalize the benefit of exporting or not, up
to general equilibrium considerations. Hence, there is no reason for a government to
discriminate across domestic exporters. While financial and information frictions may
provide a rationale for subsidizing small domestic firms, a canonical model of trade with
firm heterogeneity à la Melitz (2003) does not provide any.
Our findings hold regardless of whether the rest of the world is passive or strategic.
At a Nash equilibrium, countries still have incentives to subsidize the imports of the least
profitable foreign firms as well as no incentives to subsidize or tax the exports of the least
profitable domestic firms. Since discriminatory ad-valorem taxes create Pareto inefficien-
cies, our analysis suggests that rather than expanding the exports of less profitable firms,
an optimal trade agreement may want to restrict them. The general logic, again, is that
selection creates a motive for terms-of-trade manipulation, but one with a flipped sign,
hence the opposite recommendation for the design of trade agreements.
We view our analysis based on Melitz (2003) as a natural environment in which to
study the policy implications of firms’ selection into exports. There are, of course, other
ways to rationalize this empirical phenomenon, with potentially different policy implica-
tions. In particular, Melitz (2003) assumes that fixed exporting costs are paid by foreign
exporters. In practice, domestic importers may instead decide whether or not to pay the
fixed costs associated with the imports of additional varieties, as in Gopinath and Neiman
(2014), Halpern, Koren and Szeidl (2015), Antras, Fort and Tintelnot (2017), and Blaum,
Lelarge and Peters (2018). Intuitively, if domestic importers already internalize the fixed
costs of importing, a government may no longer want to discriminate across foreign ex-
porters. Empirically, we know fairly little about whether fixed costs are paid by exporters,
importers, or both. Our analysis suggests that such considerations may be critical for the
design of trade policy.
A similar observation applies to our assumptions about the set of available tax instru-
ments. In our baseline analysis, we have assumed that governments have full knowledge
30
of the economic environment and access to a full set of ad-valorem taxes, as one would
assume when studying optimal trade taxes in a neoclassical environment. In Section 6.2,
we have already considered an alternative environment where governments do not have
firm-level information, which forces them to impose uniform taxes across all firms. In
future work, it would be interesting to explore intermediate cases, in the spirit of Mirrlees
(1971), where governments may impose heterogeneous taxes across firms, but those may
only depend on the value of a firm’s sales.
In these and other alternative environments, we hope that the methods presented in
this paper will prove useful as well.
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A Proofs of Section 3








Ni(qij(ϕ))1/µdGi(ϕ), for i = H or j = H, (A.1b)
qFF(ϕ) =






 p̄Fj(ϕ) if µaFj(ϕ)qFj(ϕ) ≥ lFj(qFj(ϕ), ϕ),∞ otherwise, for j = H, F, (A.1e)
ΠF = NF ∑j=H,F
∫
Φ
[µaFj(ϕ)qFj(ϕ)− lFj(qFj(ϕ), ϕ)]dGF(ϕ), (A.1f)
QHF, QFF ∈ arg max
Q̃HF ,Q̃FF
{UF(Q̃HF, Q̃FF)|∑i=H,F PiFQ̃iF = wFLF + ΠF}, (A.1g)
Li = Ni ∑j=H,F
∫
Φ
lij(qij(ϕ), ϕ)dGi(ϕ), for i = H, F. (A.1h)
We now provide the formal arguments used to characterize this solution.
A.1 Home’s Production Possibility Frontier (Section 3.1)
This appendix discusses some technical details behind our analysis and characterization of op-
timal policy. Our approach in Section 4.1 was to derive necessary conditions for optimality, ap-
pealing to global Lagrangian necessity theorems. This appendix clarifies how we can invoke such
results, despite the apparent non convexity of the problems.
The minimization problem in 4.1 is not a convex optimization problem. We first convexify
this problem by allowing randomization: instead of specifying a single quantity q(ϕ) for each
blueprint ϕ, we relax this problem and let the planner choose a distribution over q conditional on
ϕ. Formally, for each ϕ there is a CDF over qHj given by MHj(q; ϕ). Letting MHj ≡ {MHj(q; ϕ)},
the inner planning problem becomes

















q1/µdMHj(q; ϕ)dGH(ϕ) ≥ Q
1/µ
Hj , for j = H, F,
whereM is the set of all families of CDFs.
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Note that M is a convex subset of a vector space. As stated, the above planning problem is
linear and, thus, convex in MHH and MHF.We have relaxed the equality to an inequality constraint
to ensure that there exists an interior point, i.e. an MHj such that the constraint holds with strict
inequality. Thus, we can apply a Lagrangian necessity theorem such as Theorem 1, p. 217 from
Luenberger (1969). This guarantees that there exists λHj ≥ 0 such that any solution to the above






















over MHH, MHF ∈ M.
Next, we argue that this minimization must be attained without randomization. In other
words, it can be described by two functions qHj(ϕ) for j = H, F. This follows from the follow-
ing two observations: (i) any MHj ∈ M is dominated by M̂Hj ∈ M that assigns probability
one to the set of points where lHj(q; ϕ)− λHjq1/µ is minimized; and (ii) the set of minimizers of
lHj(q; ϕ)− λHjq1/µ is almost everywhere unique. To verify (ii), note that from the characterization
in Section 4.1, lHj(q; ϕ)− λHjq1/µ has multiple minimizers only when
(µ− 1)(µ/λHj)−σ(aHj(ϕ))1−σ = fHj(ϕ).
Since we have assumed that for any fHj > 0 the distribution over aHj is smooth, this condition can
only hold on a set with probability zero.
At this point, we have established that the solution to the relaxed minimization problem, with
randomization, needs to minimize the associated Lagrangian and that the solution to the La-
grangian problem does not involve randomization. This implies that any solution to the original









Finally, note that for the solution of the Lagrangian problem to satisfy (9b), λHj must also be non-
zero, as stated in the main text.
A.2 Foreign’s Offer Curve (Section 3.2)
The full problem of maximizing Home’s imports, QFH, conditional on its aggregate exports, QHF,
subject to Foreign’s equilibrium conditions, i.e, conditions (1) and (4) for i = F and j = F and (2),
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(5), (6) for i = F, and (3) for j = F, is given by













 p̄Fj(ϕ) if µaFj(ϕ)qFj(ϕ) ≥ lFj(qFj(ϕ), ϕ),∞ otherwise, for j = H, F, (A.2d)
QHF, QFF ∈ arg max
Q̃HF ,Q̃FF
{UF(Q̃HF, Q̃FF)|∑i=H,F PiFQ̃iF = LF + ΠF}, (A.2e)
ΠF = NF ∑j=H,F
∫
Φ
[µaFj(ϕ)qFj(ϕ)− lFj(qFj(ϕ), ϕ)]dGF(ϕ), (A.2f)




Constraints (A.2b)-(A.2d) can be used to solve for the local micro quantities and prices in Foreign,
as a function of QFF,
qFF(ϕ|QFF) =
q̄FF(ϕ|QFF) , if µaFF(ϕ)q̄FF(ϕ|QFF) ≥ lFF(q̄FF(ϕ|QFF), ϕ),0 , otherwise; (A.3)
pFF(ϕ|QFF) =







with q̄FF(ϕ|QFF) ≡ [µaFF(ϕ)/PFF(QFF)]−σQFF. Total employment associated with the local sales





In turn, constraint (A.2e) can be used to solve for Home’s export price as a function of QHF and
QFF. The necessary first order conditions for utility maximization in Foreign imply
PHF(QHF, QFF) = PFF(QFF)MRSF(QHF, QFF), (A.7)
where MRSF(QHF, QFF) ≡ (∂UF/∂QHF)/(∂UF/∂QFF) is the marginal rate of substitution in For-
eign. Combining the previous equation with Foreign’s budget constraint, as well as constraints
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(A.2f) and (A.2g), we can rearrange constraint (A.2e) more compactly as
NF
∫
[µaFH(ϕ)qFH(ϕ)]dGF(ϕ) = PFF(QFF)MRSF(QHF, QFF)QHF.
Substituting the previous expressions into problem A.2, we get that Home’s optimal import quan-
tities, qFH, as well as the level of local output in Foreign, QFF, must solve (11).
We can derive necessary conditions for optimality of qFH, appealing to global Lagrangian
necessity theorems, as we did in Section 4.1. Consider the subproblem that takes QHF and QFF
as given and maximizes over qFH. Specifically, allowing for randomization we can rewrite the













µaFH(ϕ)q dMFH(q; ϕ) dGF(ϕ) = PFF(QFF)MRSF(QHF, QFF)QHF,





lFH(q, ϕ) dMFH(q; ϕ) dGF(ϕ),
where
MFH = {MFH ∈ M : ∀ϕ ∈ Φ,
∫
{q:µaFH(ϕ)q−lFH(q,ϕ)<0}
dMFH(q; ϕ) = 0}
is the set of probability distributions that ensures positive profits with probability one for all firms.
As stated, this problem is linear and, thus, convex. It features two equality constraints. Invoking
the Lagrangian necessity theorem given by Theorem 1, p. 217 from Luenberger (1969) extended
in Exercise 8.8.7 (p. 236), there exist multipliers λT and λL for the equality constraints so that any




[q1/µ − λTµaFH(ϕ)q− λLlFH(q, ϕ)]dMFH(q; ϕ) dGF(ϕ)
over MFH ∈ MFH. As before, since the objective is linear in MFH it follows that we can focus on a
“bang bang” solution that puts full weight on any point q for each ϕ that minimizes
q1/µ − λTµaFH(ϕ)q− λLlFH(q, ϕ)
over the set of q satisfying µaFH(ϕ)q ≥ lFH(q, ϕ). By virtue of the analysis carried out in Section
4.2, the solution to this problem is unique almost everywhere. This follows since indifference
obtains only if fFH(ϕ) > 0 and for at most two values of θFH(ϕ), namely θFH(ϕ) = λ1/σL (χFH)
1/µ, if
λT < 0, or θFH(ϕ) = max{0, λL + λT}, otherwise. But under our assumption that for any fFH > 0
the distribution over aFH(ϕ) is smooth, it follows that indifference happens with probability zero.
As in the first micro problem, this implies that any solution to the second micro problem without
randomization is also a solution to the relaxed version with randomization, and so maximizes the
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corresponding Lagrangian.
Once optimal quantities, qFH(ϕ|QHF, QFF), have been solved for, optimal import prices are
given by
pFH(ϕ|QHF, QFF) =
µaFH(ϕ) , if µaFH(ϕ)qFH(ϕ|QHF, QFF) ≥ lFH(qFH(ϕ|QHF, QFF), ϕ),∞ , otherwise.
(A.8)







FF (ϕ|QHF, QFF)dGF(ϕ)) (A.9)
with ΩF the set of QFF for which a solution to the inner maximization problem exists.
A.3 First-Order Conditions of the Macro Problem (Section 3.3)
At an interior solution to the macro problem (14), the necessary first-order conditions are given by






HF) = ΛH L
∗
HF,
where U∗iH ≡ ∂UH/∂QiH denotes the marginal utility at home of the aggregate good from country
i = H, F; L∗Hj ≡ ∂LH/∂QHj denotes the marginal cost of producing and delivering one unit of
the home good in country j = H, F; and ΛT and ΛH are the Lagrange multipliers associated with











































∗ ≡ PHF(Q∗HF)/P̃FH(Q∗HF, Q∗FH), and η∗ ≡ d ln QFH/d ln QHF.
B Proofs of Section 4
Let ({q∗ij, Q∗ij}i,j=H,F, p∗FF, p∗FH, P∗FF, P∗HF) denote a solution to Home’s relaxed planning problem.
In the main text, we have already described some of these variables. Before establishing Lem-










domestic micro quantities, q∗HH = {qHH(ϕ|Q∗HH, Q∗HF)} and q∗HF = {qHF(ϕ|Q∗HH, Q∗HF)}, are





is given by condition (A.9), whereas the foreign micro quantities, q∗FH = {qFH(ϕ|Q∗HF)} and
q∗FF = {qFF(ϕ|QFF(Q∗HF))}, are given by conditions (13) and (A.3). Finally, the prices of foreign
varieties, p∗FF = {pFF(ϕ|QFF(Q∗HF))} and p∗FH = {pFH(ϕ|QFF(Q∗HF))}, are given by equations














the average cost of imports at home. Note that P̃∗FH differs from the import price index faced by
Home consumers in the decentralized equilibrium, PFH, which is inclusive of taxes.
B.1 Lemma 4
Proof of Lemma 4. First, consider the marginal rate of substitution, MRS∗j ≡ U∗Hj/U∗Fj, in country
j = H, F at a solution to Home’s relaxed planning problem. In Foreign, the necessary first order




FF. Combining this expression with





















































Next, consider a decentralized equilibrium with taxes that implements a solution to the relaxed
planning problem. The marginal rate of substitution for each of the two countries is determined
by conditions (2)-(4). Using the fact that the set of varieties available for consumption in the




























Combining equations (B.1), (B.3), (B.4), and (B.5) with the micro-level taxes in Lemmas 1-3, we get
(1 + t∗FH)/(1 + t
∗
HH)





































At a solution to Home’s relaxed planning problem, constraint (14b) must be satisfied with equality.
Otherwise, Home could raise its imports, QFH, and hence the utility of its representative agent.




































Substituting into equation (B.6) and using the definition of ΦuFH and Φ
c
FH we get equation (21).
B.2 Lemma 5
Proof of Lemma 5. In order to show the existence of a decentralized equilibrium that implements
the desired allocation, we follow a guess and verify strategy. Consider: (i) quantities such that
qij(ϕ) = q∗ij(ϕ), (B.8)
Qij = Q∗ij; (B.9)
(ii) aggregate profits such that
Πi = Ni ∑j=H,F
∫
Φ
[µwiaij(ϕ)qij(ϕ)− wilij(qij(ϕ), ϕ)]dGi(ϕ) for all i; (B.10)




wF = 1; (B.12)
(iv) goods prices such that
pHj(ϕ) =
 p̄Hj(ϕ) , if µaHj(ϕ)qHj(ϕ) ≥ lHj(qHj(ϕ), ϕ),∞ , otherwise, (B.13)





NH [(1 + tHH(ϕ))pHH(ϕ)]1−σdGH(ϕ), (B.15)
PHF = P∗HF, (B.16)
PFH = P̃∗FH/η
∗, (B.17)
PFF = P∗FF; (B.18)
(v) taxes such that
sHj(ϕ) = s∗Hj, for all ϕ and for j = H, F, (B.19)
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tHH(ϕ) = t∗HH, for all ϕ, (B.20)
tFH(ϕ) = t∗FH(ϕ), if ϕ ∈ ΦFH, (B.21)
tFH(ϕ) ≥ t∗FH, otherwise, (B.22)
with s∗Hj = 0 for j = H, F, t
∗
HH = 0, t
∗
FH(ϕ) given by equation (20), and t
∗
FH given by equation (21);








We now check that the previous allocation and prices satisfy the equilibrium conditions (1)-(7).
First, consider conditions (5) and (7). Since they are equivalent to equations (B.10) and (B.23),
respectively, they trivially satisfied by construction.
Second, consider condition (2). For goods that are produced by home firms, they are equiva-
lent to equations (B.13). So, it is again trivially satisfied. For goods that are produced by foreign
firms, condition (2) derives from equations (A.4), (A.8), (B.8), and (B.14).
Third, consider condition (4). For goods locally sold by home firms, it directly derives from
condition (B.15). For goods exported by home firms, one can use the same argument as in the




















Condition (4) then derives from the previous equation and equations (B.13) and (B.19). Next,
consider goods locally sold by foreign firms. For those, condition (4) derives from equations (A.4),
(A.5), (B.8), (B.14), and (B.18). Finally, for goods exported by foreign firms, we already know from
equation (B.6) that
(1 + t∗FH)/(1 + t
∗
HH)











Combining the previous expression with equations (20), (B.21), (B.22), and using the fact that
44
s∗Hj = 0 for j = H, F and t
∗




NF((1 + tFH(ϕ))µaFH(ϕ))1−σdGF(ϕ))1/(1−σ) = P̃∗FH/η
∗.
Condition (4) derives from the previous expression and equations (A.8), (B.14), and (B.17).
Fourth, consider condition (1). For goods locally sold by foreign firms, condition (1) directly
derives from equations (A.3), (B.8), (B.9), and (B.18). For goods exported by home firms, note that





Since the previous equation follows from equations (B.24) and (B.16), condition (1) must hold for
goods exported by home firms. We can use a similar logic to analyze micro-level quantities sold
at Home. Given equations (B.8), (B.11), (B.13), (B.9), and (B.20) with t∗HH = 0, condition (1) holds
















which follows from equations (B.2), (B.13), (B.15), (B.16), (B.19), (B.20), as well as the fact that
condition (4) holds for goods exported by home firms. Lastly, consider goods exported by foreign
firms. Given equations (B.8), (B.9), (B.12), (B.14), (B.21), and (B.22), condition (1) holds if
(µχFHaFH(ϕ))−σ = [(1 + t∗FH)µaFH(ϕ)/PFH ]
−σQ∗FH, if ϕ ∈ ΦuFH,
fFH(ϕ)/((µ− 1)aFH(ϕ)) = [(1 + t∗FH)(θFH(ϕ)/χFH)µaFH(ϕ)/PFH ]−σQ∗FH, if ϕ ∈ ΦcFH,
Given the definition of θFH(ϕ), both conditions reduce to
1/χFH = (Q∗FH)
1/σPFH/(1 + t∗FH). (B.28)











Since condition (4) holds for goods exported by foreign firms, we also know from equations (B.10),
(B.21), and (B.22) that







Equation (B.28) derives from the two previous observations. Hence, condition (1) must also hold
for goods exported by foreign firms.
Fifth, consider the labor market condition (6). Abroad, this condition derives from equations
(11c), (A.6), (B.8), and (B.9). At home, constraint (14c) implies
LH(Q∗HH, Q
∗
HF) = LH. (B.29)
Condition (6) then derives from the definition of LH(QHH, QHF) and equations (B.8), (B.9), and
(B.29).
Finally, consider condition (3). Abroad, it is trivially satisfied by construction. At Home, we




















By equation (B.17), we then get
U∗FH/U
∗
HH = PFH/PHH. (B.31)








and in turn, using equation (B.9),













Combining this observation with equations (B.13), (B.16), (B.19), and (B.20) we get








Since condition (5) holds at home, this can be rearranged as
PHHQHH + P∗HFQHF = NHwH ∑j=H,F
∫
Φ
lHj(qHj(ϕ), ϕ)dGH(ϕ) + ΠH.
Since condition (6) also holds, we then get
PHHQHH + P∗HFQHF = wH LH + ΠH.
Combining this expression with equation (B.32), we obtain
PHHQHH + P̃∗FHQFH = wH LH + ΠH. (B.33)









µ(1 + tFH(ϕ))aFH(ϕ)qFH(ϕ)dGF(ϕ). (B.34)





Combining equation (B.23) with equations (B.33), (B.34), and (B.35), we finally obtain
PHHQHH + PFHQFH = wH LH + ΠH + TH. (B.36)
Condition (3) at home derives from equations (B.31) and (B.36).
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